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Abstract
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronise the clocks of a signicant
percentage of the computers that make up the internet. Occasional large adjustments made
to the local clock of our department’s main NTP server (kaka) lead us to investigate the state
of the NTP subnet in New Zealand. We examined the structure of the NTP subnet within
New Zealand, recorded performance information for over 350 New Zealand NTP servers and
investigated the reasons for the occasional large adjustments made to kaka’s clock.
The overall NTP performance gures for New Zealand NTP servers compare favourably
with those reported in a world-wide study of NTP performance. However, the lack of any
primary NTP servers in New Zealand, and the concentration of all secondary servers at a single
site, were major factors in the occasional large adjustments made on kaka. Also, a feature of
the NTP ltering algorithm was a factor in some of the large adjustments. At a more detailed
level, several cases were found in which an NTP conguration could be improved.
Our overall conclusion is that the accuracy of NTP in New Zealand could be improved by
installing two or three primary servers, backed up by several secondary servers.
1 Introduction
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used extensively throughout the Internet to keep computer
time of day clocks close to Universal Time (UTC) [4, 2]. A host on which the NTP software
runs is known as an NTP server. A small proportion of NTP servers are primary servers that
are connected to external sources of UTC, such as GPS receivers or radio clocks. All other NTP
servers synchronise, directly or indirectly, to one or more primary servers. The most signicant
source of error in NTP timekeeping is variability in network delays experienced by NTP packets
that contain timing information.
Many New Zealand organisations operate NTP servers. Several reasons exist for believing that
the accuracy achieved by NTP in New Zealand may be worse than that achieved in other parts of
the Internet:
 There are no public primary servers in New Zealand at present. The New Zealand NTP
subnet relies on overseas primary servers (most in the United States and Australia) that are
accessed via long distance network links that are frequently congested.
 There are three public1 secondary NTP servers in New Zealand|all operated by the Uni-
versity of Waikato. With all three secondary servers on the same site, the New Zealand
NTP subnet is more vulnerable to congestion and failure of network links to Waikato than
it would be if secondary servers were available at several sites.
 In earlier work on measuring the accuracy of NTP using a locally-developed test bed [1], it
was noted that our department’s main NTP server would sometimes step its clock by a large
amount (an amount over 128 milliseconds). Such steps are signs that NTP is not working
well.
Consequently, a study has been undertaken to investigate the health of the New Zealand NTP
subnet. Also of interest was the extent to which NTP is being used in New Zealand, and the
structure of the New Zealand NTP subnet.
In the next section, we give an overview of how NTP operates, and discuss previous NTP
studies. This is followed by a description of our experimental procedures, details of the structure
of the New Zealand NTP subnet, and the overall performance of NTP within New Zealand. Next,
we detail some reasons behind the large steps observed on our local NTP servers. Finally we
present our conclusions.
Note that in making observations about the New Zealand NTP subnet there is no intent to
be critical of the system administrators involved. Their conguration may well meet their clock
synchronisation needs very well.
1That is, listed in http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/ntp/servers.htm
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2 Background
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) has evolved over a period of nearly 20 years. Version 3 is
very widely used|the number of computers whose clocks are synchronised by NTP worldwide is
probably in the hundreds of thousands [3]|and development of version 4 of the protocol is well
advanced. The main design goal of NTP is to tightly synchronise to UTC the clocks of a large
number of computers distributed throughout the Internet. Important sub-goals are that NTP
should be able to scale to huge numbers of hosts, and that NTP should operate well in the wide
range of network architectures and trac conditions present in today’s Internet.
Each NTP server exchanges timing information with between 1 and a few hundred other NTP
servers (commonly this number is less than 10). Communication links between NTP servers are
arranged in a broadly hierarchical fashion. A relatively small group of NTP servers are attached to
devices such as GPS receivers and radio clocks that are direct sources of UTC timing information.
An NTP server with direct access to a source of external time is said to be at stratum 1 (level 1)
of the NTP hierarchy. Every other NTP server synchronises its clock, directly or indirectly, to the
clocks of one or more stratum 1 servers.
An NTP server at stratum N is congured (by hand) to exchange timing information with 1
or more peers, at least one of which is a stratum N −1 NTP server, with the others being stratum
N servers (peers at the same stratum are primarily used to provide backup synchronisation paths
to be used when lower stratum peers cannot be contacted or are faulty). For each peer, an NTP
server regularly estimates the oset between its own clock and that of the peer based on time
stamps present in a message sent to the peer and a reply message sent back by the peer. The
main source of error in a clock oset estimate is asymmetry in the network delays experienced by
the two packets. While the delay experienced by each message is unknown, the round trip delay
(the sum of the two delays) is known, and the maximum error due to packet delay asymmetry is
simply half the round trip delay.
An NTP server uses ltering, intersection and clustering, and combining algorithms to translate
the streams of oset estimates produced for each peer to a single estimate of the oset between
the NTP server’s local clock and UTC. Each stream of peer oset estimates is ltered so that
estimates calculated from packets that exhibited a large delay are ignored because of the large
error that could be present in the oset estimates. Filtering produces one oset estimate per peer.
These osets are put through intersection and clustering algorithms which discard some osets and
retain those deemed to be of the highest accuracy. The nal overall oset is a weighted average of
the osets that survive the clustering and intersection algorithms. The peer whose oset had the
most influence on the overall oset is deemed the system peer, and the stratum of the NTP server
is 1 more than the stratum of the system peer.
The structure of the NTP subnet is determined in a somewhat anarchic fashion by the system
administrators of the various NTP servers. Advice in the NTP documentation suggests that for
large sites, there should be three on-site NTP servers at stratum N , with remaining on-site NTP
servers arranged in a synchronisation subnet beneath them. Consequently, the remaining on-site
servers run at stratum N + 1 or more. It is recommended that each of the on-site stratum N
servers synchronises to at least two independent o-site servers at stratum N − 1 (making a total
of at least 6 stratum N − 1 servers). Also, each of the stratum N servers should synchronise to
each other to provide further redundancy. It is strongly recommended that the stratum N − 1
o-site servers be accessed via dierent network links so as to ensure no single point of failure
exists.
If highly accurate synchronisation is required at a particular site, it is likely that the main on-
site servers would be equipped with external sources of time, and operate at stratum 1. Otherwise,
the main on-site servers usually operate at stratum 2 or 3 by peering with o-site servers that
operate at strata 1 or 2. Other on-site servers therefore operate at strata 3, 4 or 5 (few hosts
in the global NTP subnet are at stratum 6 or more, even though the software can support NTP
servers operating at stratum 15). Within a site, it is possible to distribute time (at the cost
of some reduction in accuracy) via lightweight mechanisms based on broadcast and multicast
communication.
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To assist a system administrator in selecting lower stratum NTP hosts to peer with, a web
page is maintained listing public primary (stratum 1) and secondary (stratum 2) time servers. A
public NTP server is one that is willing to provide time information to NTP servers at other sites.
At the time of writing there were 70 public primary servers and just over 100 public secondary
servers. No formal mechanism exists for getting information on public servers at stratum 3, or on
other primary or secondary servers.
For a system administrator in New Zealand, there are only two entries in the lists of public NTP
servers that mention New Zealand. In the primary list, ntp.cs.mu.OZ.AU (located in Melbourne,
Australia) includes New Zealand in its service area. Three New Zealand stratum 2 servers are
listed in the secondary list|all located at Waikato University. These facts underscore some of
the potential problems with the New Zealand NTP subnet raised in the introduction. With no
primary NTP servers in New Zealand, the quality of all timing information is dependent on the
delays experienced on our international Internet links. Also, with all three public secondary servers
located at one site, New Zealand system administrators either have to synchronise only to the three
Waikato servers (which creates a single point of failure, and makes accuracy dependent on low
delays on paths to and from Waikato) or maintain links with overseas primary and secondary
servers (which involve much longer delays, and which in some cases will incur trac charges).
3 Experimental procedures
Two of our major goals were to uncover the current structure of the New Zealand part of the NTP
subnet, and to compare v performance measures taken from New Zealand NTP hosts with those
reported in studies of the global NTP subnet.
A data collection program, ntpcrawl, was written to gather data on both the structure and
accuracy of the New Zealand NTP subnet. The program uses the standard xntpdc program to
interrogate NTP servers. ntpcrawl takes as a command line argument the host name of the rst
NTP server start that is to be queried. Four xntpdc queries are made of that host:
 sysinfo, which returns the internet address of the system peer, the stratum of NTP server
start, its root distance and root dispersion.
 loopinfo, which returns the current loop oset and the frequency dierence between the
local oscillator and UTC.
 peers, which returns for each peer its IP number, its stratum, the interval between polls
initiated by start, the reachability mask (shows which of the last 8 messages sent to the peer
were replied to), round trip delay to the peer, estimate of the oset between the peer’s clock
and that of start, and the dispersion measure associated with that oset.
 monlist, which returns a list of internet addresses of NTP servers that have communicated
with start.
Once information from start has been gathered, ntpcrawl begins working its way through
the NTP servers listed in the output of the peers and monlist requests. As new NTP servers
are discovered, they are added to the list of servers to be visited in the future. ntpcrawl keeps
working its way through NTP servers until all NTP servers discovered have been visited.
Some NTP servers listed by peers and monlist (for some NTP server S) are not visited, or
have only a subset of the four requests sent to them. This happens in the following situations:
 If S is not in New Zealand, only the sysinfo and loopinfo requests are attempted (in other
words, when a server outside New Zealand is reached no attempt is made to continue the
search past S). A server is deemed to be in New Zealand if its DNS hostname ends in \.nz".
This is not a fool-proof test of whether a host is in New Zealand or not (some .nz hosts we
encountered were clearly in Los Angeles) but its accuracy is reasonably high.
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 If either the sysinfo or loopinfo request fails, then the peers and monlist requests are
not made.
 If the stratum of S is 16 (NTP sets the stratum to 16 if the local clock is not synchronised)
then the peers and monlist requests are not made.
 A host H returned by monlist is visited only if:
– H has been communicating with S on port 123 (port 123 is used by NTP daemons)
– H has exchanged at least 25 packets with S (indicates regular contact between H and
S which makes it likely that H is a client of S).
– the version of NTP being used by H must be 3 (there was a concern that some of the
data collected from earlier versions of NTP might have been calculated in a dierent
way).
– H and S must have communicated in the last 1024 seconds.
Some of these tests are made to ensure that we narrow down the hosts returned by monlist
to those that are likely to be currently active clients or peers of S.
Inevitably, ntpcrawl did not nd all NTP servers in New Zealand. Many NTP servers are
hidden behind rewalls, and were inaccessible to the computer on which ntpcrawl was run. At
each site these inaccessible servers tend to be servers at higher strata. The key lower stratum
servers need to be able to communicate with o-site peers, so are generally accessible through
rewalls.
In addition ntpcrawl will not nd NTP servers that have no connection with the three Waikato
secondary servers. Also, some NTP servers refuse to respond to xntpdc queries. Nevertheless, a
sizeable number of New Zealand NTP servers (355) were successfully visited. Data collected from
these servers is presented in the next two sections.
One thing to bear in mind when looking at the gures is that because the data was collected
on one of our machines, a group of 91 stratum 4 servers in the cosc.canterbury.ac.nz domain
were included in the data collected. These machines are not accessible through the University
rewall, and would have been excluded had the monitoring been done outside the University.
4 The structure of the New Zealand NTP subnet
To collect data over a range of network conditions, ntpcrawl was run four times a day (starting
at 0305, 0905, 1505 and 2105) for seven successive days. With the exception of one run during
which there was a network outage, each run took between 42 and 67 minutes to complete, with
only 5 of the 28 runs taking over 50 minutes.
The number of hosts visited on each run was pretty consistent. With the exception of two low
values that most likely resulted from network outages, the number of hosts visited ranged from
603 to 667, and on all but 6 of the 28 runs more than 630 hosts were visited. The results given
below on the structure of the New Zealand NTP subnet are based on analysis of the largest log
le, which was recorded between 2105 and 2152 on 1998-11-28.
Of the 667 \hosts" discovered in that run, three were actually local clocks, so 664 real NTP
servers were discovered. These 664 servers can be split into 3 groups based on their location.
Hostname lookup failed in 101 cases|we are unable to say whether these servers are in New
Zealand or overseas (although the majority are probably in New Zealand). Of the remaining 563
hosts, 523 were located in New Zealand and 40 were overseas.
Table 1 shows for each group of NTP servers the number of servers at each stratum. Of the
17 overseas stratum 1 servers, 8 were in the United States, 2 were in Japan, 3 were in Australia, 3
were in Germany, and 1 was in the United Kingdom. The NTP servers whose stratum is unknown
are those that would not respond to the sysinfo request (the server stratum is one of the elds
returned by sysinfo).
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Servers at each stratum Stratum
Location Servers 1 2 3 4 5 16 unknown
Overseas 40 17 9 14 0 0 0 1
Unknown 98 0 3 4 1 1 0 89
New Zealand 526 0 12 183 153 8 1 169
Table 1: Breakdown of the number of NTP servers at each stratum for each of the three server
groups.
% servers at each stratum
Group Servers 1 2 3 4 5 6-14
Internet 13880 1.5% 32.0% 47.5% 16.2% 2.3% 0.4%
New Zealand 356 0.0% 3.4% 51.4% 43.0% 2.2% 0.0%
Table 2: Comparison of the proportions of NTP servers at each stratum as found by us within
New Zealand, and Mills et al. in their Internet-wide study
It is interesting to compare the proportions of New Zealand NTP servers that belong to each
stratum with those typical of the global Internet. Table 2 compares the percentages extracted
from our data with percentages computed from a recent Internet-wide survey. The lack of public
primary servers in New Zealand means that New Zealand servers tend to be concentrated at strata
3 and 4, whereas in the internet as a whole servers are concentrated more at strata 2 and 3. The
average stratum for New Zealand servers is 3.4 as against 2.9 for the internet as a whole. With
New Zealand having no stratum 1 servers, you might have thought the dierence between the
averages would be 1. The fact that the dierence is 0.5 indicates that the New Zealand hierarchy
is somewhat shallower than the internet-wide hierarchy, which is not surprising given that the
New Zealand NTP subnet is much smaller.
Further analysis is focused on the 526 New Zealand hosts. In fact, most of the analysis is done
for 355 hosts in New Zealand whose stratum could be determined (in 169 cases the stratum could
not be determined), which were operating at a valid stratum (1 host was operating at stratum
16) and that returned a valid list of peers (1 at stratum 3 did not). We will call these datasets
the \allNZ" dataset and the \respondNZ" dataset (note that the respondNZ dataset is a subset
of the allNZ dataset).
The rst analysis we did was to determine how evenly NTP usage was spread across the New
Zealand second and third level domains. Table 3 summarises for each level 2 domain the number
of NTP servers in that level 2 domain, and the number of dierent level 3 domains these servers
belonged to. Information is given for both datasets.
The right hand column is present to allow comparisons between the distribution of NTP servers
# of hosts # of level 3 domains Percent
Domain allNZ respondNZ allNZ respondNZ IP domains
ac.nz 324 222 9 9 0.7%
co.nz 99 48 28 19 85.6%
net.nz 62 56 12 11 3.8%
govt.nz 22 18 7 4 1.4%
gen.nz 18 11 6 4 1.5%
school.nz 1 0 1 0 1.4%
Table 3: For each second level domain, this table shows the number of NTP servers present in the
domain, and the number of of level 3 domains the servers are spread across.
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Domain NTP servers
clear.net.nz 10
netgate.net.nz 11
manawatu.gen.nz 12
clix.net.nz 15
comnet.co.nz 16
otago.ac.nz 23
ihug.co.nz 26
massey.ac.nz 34
auckland.ac.nz 58
waikato.ac.nz 87
canterbury.ac.nz 94
Table 4: The level 3 domains in which at least 10 NTP servers were visited (allNZ dataset).
across the various level 2 domains with the sizes of the various level 2 domains. The percentages
in the right hand column2 show the percentage of the 17460 IP-connected organisations in New
Zealand that belong to each level 2 domain. It would have been better to know the percentage of
the 174201 New Zealand internet addresses that belong to each group, but this information was
not available. The percentages add up to 99.8% (none of the NTP servers visited were classied
as being in the cri, iwi or mil level 2 domains).
Our method for associating each host with a level 3 (and therefore a level 2) domain needs some
explanation. It was assumed that all hosts in the same (class B or C) network were in the same
level 3 domain. So for each class B and C network number, all hosts in that network were counted
as being in the same level 3 domain. However, there were 6 networks that contained hosts that
belonged to two or more level 3 domains. For example, 16 servers were found in network 131.203.
Of these, 1 was in the irl.cri.nz domain, 3 were in grace.cri.nz, 1 was in huttcity.govt.nz
and 11 were in comnet.co.nz. In the gures presented in Table 3, all 16 121.203 hosts were
counted as belonging to govt.nz. If the second column was recalculated so that it was based on
host names, the only signicant changes would be to increase .co.nz to 108, reduce govt.nz to
7 and to add a count of 4 for cri.nz.
From the table it is clear that despite the fact the ac (academic) domain accounts for a very
small proportion of IP connected organisations, it nevertheless contains a signicant majority of
the NTP servers visited. The average number of NTP servers at each site is high, because the 324
servers are spread across only 9 level 3 domains. It is also clear that given its size, relatively few
NTP servers were visited in the co (commercial) domain. Finally, the net domain contains quite
a few NTP servers in relation to its size, which indicates that ISPs and operators of backbone
links have a considerable interest in synchronising the clocks of their computers.
Table 4 lists the top 10 individual level 3 domains in terms of the number of NTP servers found
in the domain in the allNZ dataset.
Having examined the distribution of NTP servers over second and third level domains, we
now describe the structure (that is, the links between servers) of the New Zealand NTP subnet.
Table 5 gives a per-stratum summary of the number of peers each NTP server synchronises to. A
general trend apparent from the table is that as the stratum level decreases, the average number
of peers synchronised to increases. This is not surprising. Each low stratum NTP server generally
provides time service for a number of higher stratum servers. Consequently, low stratum NTP
servers generally synchronise to at least 3 peers so that good accuracy is maintained. High stratum
NTP servers have few, if any, clients. Accuracy and reliability of the time service is a lower priority
for such NTP servers, and so they generally synchronise to fewer peers.
Table 6 gives a per-stratum summary of the number of clients that synchronise to each NTP
2These percentages were computed from the 1998-12-01 gures presented in
http://webpages.netlink.co.nz/~mark/netsites-growth.html.
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In column N are the number of servers at each stratum synchronising to N peers
Stratum (S) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 4 3 2 1 1 1
3 18 58 39 17 6 14 3 3 9 12 3
4 112 11 24 4 1 1
5 8
Table 5: Per-stratum counts of the number of peers each NTP server synchronises to (respondNZ
dataset).
In column N are the number of NTP servers at each stratum with N clients.
S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2 5 1 2 1
3 97 12 16 9 7 6 12 6 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 2
4 145 3 1 1 2
Table 6: Per-stratum counts of the number of clients that synchronise to each NTP server (re-
spondNZ dataset). Omitted are three stratum 2 counts (62, 123, 171) and two stratum 3 counts
(21, 91).
server. Taking into account the additional information in the caption, the general trend is that
as the stratum level decreases, the average number of clients per NTP server increases. Again,
this is as expected. There are relatively few low stratum NTP servers, and they commonly pass
on timing information to many clients. At higher strata, many NTP servers are leaves of the
hierarchy and have no clients.
The following sub-sections provide a more detailed analysis of the information presented in
Tables 5 and 6, as well as providing new information.
4.1 Top level servers
This section discusses the highest level (lowest stratum) servers in the New Zealand NTP subnet.
In the ntpcrawl run we are reporting, a total of 12 New Zealand stratum 2 servers were detected.
Even though it did not respond in this particular run of ntpcrawl, there is actually a private
stratum 1 NTP server in New Zealand located at the University of Otago (this server has responded
on other occasions). The presence of the stratum 1 server is reflected in our data. Three of
the stratum 2 servers detected are located in Otago, and are clients of the Otago stratum 1
server. None of these three stratum 2 servers has any clients. This means that the stratum 1
Otago server and its small number of clients is a self-contained hierarchy that does not contribute
any timing information to the wider New Zealand NTP subnet. Two other stratum 2 servers
(gateb.opus.co.nz and aitken.scitec.auckland.ac.nz) also have no clients.
Of the remaining seven stratum 2 servers, four have a small number of clients. A stratum
2 server at Victoria University with an unknown host name (130.195.12.1) has a single client.
wiatemata.ait.ac.nz has two other AIT machines as clients. cisco2.atrix.gen.nz has two
clients at Saturn. tui.grace.cri.nz has 10 immediate clients, and 10 further clients below
them. Because each NTP server can synchronises to multiple servers, many of the servers that
synchronise (directly or indirectly) to one of the non-Waikato stratum 2 servers also synchronises
to one or more of the three Waikato stratum 2 servers.
Not surprisingly, the three public secondary servers at Waikato have much larger numbers of
clients than any of the other stratum 2 servers. Table 7 summarises for each of Waikato’s stratum
2 servers the number of clients at each stratum. The dominance of Waikato’s stratum 2 servers
is clear. The machine with the smallest number of clients (johnwayne) has more clients than the
other 9 New Zealand stratum 2 servers put together.
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Clients at stratum
Server 2 3 4
ankh 7 152 2
ramses 3 117 2
johnwayne 3 58 1
Table 7: Client counts for the three public secondary servers at Waikato.
Most clients of the Waikato secondary servers are at stratum 3 (they are synchronised to a
stratum 2 server). Some clients are at stratum 2 (for example, each Waikato machine is synchro-
nised to the other two). Links between servers at the same stratum enable backup synchronisation
paths. In a couple of cases clients are at stratum 4. This is an unusual situation in which the
client has decided that some other server at stratum 3 is a better synchronisation source. In one
case, ns1.manawatu.gen.nz is a client of all three Waikato stratum 3 servers, but has decided
that mailhost.manawatu.gen.nz is a better synchronisation source, even though it in turn has
ramses as its system peer.
Another way of assessing the importance of the various NTP servers is to analyse the tree that
results when you consider the links between each NTP server and its system peer. Although an
NTP server often computes corrections to its local clocks by combining timing information from
several peers, the system peer is the one deemed to be most influential (for example, the stratum
of an NTP server is 1 greater than that of its system peer).
The system peer of ankh was time-a.nist.gov. A total of 239 NTP servers, at strata 3, 4
and 5, are directly below ankh in the tree. The system peer of ramses was time-b.nist.gov,
and 23 stratum 3 and 4 NTP servers were below ramses. Finally, the system peer of johnwayne
was tictoc.tip.CSIRO.AU, and 60 stratum 3 and 4 NTP servers were below johnwayne. It is
interesting that even though johnwayne had many fewer clients than ramses, it had many more
clients for which it was system peer. Overall then, 322 NTP servers had (directly or indirectly)
one of the Waikato secondary servers as their system peer.
Only two other stratum 2 New Zealand servers had one or more clients for which they were
system peers (the other seven either had no clients or had clients whose system peers were other
NTP servers). The system peer of tui.grace.cri.nzwas tictoc.tip.CSIRO.AU, and 14 stratum
3, 4 and 5 NTP servers were below tui. Also, waitemata.ait.ac.nz had one NTP server beneath
it.
Finally, a small number of machines at stratum 3 had system peers (of stratum 2) outside New
Zealand. Five clix.net.nz servers (which from their names were actually located in Los Angeles)
had between them as their system peers two stratum 2 servers at the University of Delaware.
puka2.ait.ac.nz had as its system peer sun2.bnl.gov (which is interesting, because puka was
also a client of a much closer stratum 2 server|waitemata.ac.nz). mx4.ix.net.nz had as its
system peer eagle.tamu.edu. Two stratum three ix.net.nz servers had DNS.CIT.CORNELL.EDU
as their system peer, and three stratum four servers were in turn below them.
Adding up all NTP servers encountered that were not below one of the Waikato secondary
servers gives a total of 38, compared to the 325 you get for the hierarchies of the Waikato secondary
servers.
4.2 Servers that synchronise to large numbers of peers
Each of the three Waikato secondary servers peered with the other two. In addition, ankh and
ramses were clients of three overseas servers and johnwayne was the client of ve overseas servers.
However, it is clear from Table 5 that some NTP servers had many more peers (between 9 and
16) than the three main New Zealand servers. This section looks at the 30 NTP servers that
synchronised to 9 or more peers.
A stratum 2 server at Victoria University (somewhat heroically) synchronised to 16 peers. Ten
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were overseas (nine of which were at stratum 1), four were stratum 3 servers at Victoria (which
goes against advice not to synchronise to peers at a higher stratum), and the others were ankh
and ramses. It is not clear why this machine had so many peers. It is not as if the machine had
a large number of clients. In fact it had only one client (sinbad.regy.vuw.ac.nz). Ironically,
sinbad is also a client of ankh, and ankh was the system peer of sinbad when the monitoring run
occurred.
Many of the NTP servers with large numbers of peers were operated by Clear Communications,
and belonged to the level 3 domains clear.net.nz and clix.net.nz. These included 3 servers
with 16 peers, 6 with 11 peers and 8 with 10 peers. All 17 servers peered with ankh and with
between 8 and 10 other clix/clear servers. In addition, three of these servers (all with \LosAngeles"
in their host names) peered with the same 7 NTP servers in the United States. Evidently Clear
were keen to maintain time services for their backbone machines in the face of many faults. Paths
to stratum 1 servers were via ankh and via the three \LosAngeles" hosts with links to United
States. Interestingly, a fourth \LosAngeles" host had only one peer (ankh).
Another group of backbone hosts with large numbers of peers was present in the ix.net.nz
domain. Two had 10 peers and three had 9 peers. These NTP servers each synchronised to 3 or
4 other ix.net.nz servers, 4 overseas servers and ankh and ramses.
The other group of servers with many peers were to be found in the manawatu.gen.nz domain
(six had 11 peers, one had 12). All synchronised to 7 or 8 other manawatu.gen.nz hosts and the
three Waikato secondary servers.
4.3 More detailed observations on structure
The NTP documentation contains guidelines about how NTP should be established within an
administrative domain. Some are worth paraphrasing here to allow comparison with the structures
within New Zealand.
In the case of a gateway or le server providing service to a signicant number of work-
stations or le servers in an enterprise network it is even more important to provide
multiple, redundant sources of synchronization and multiple, diversity-routed, network
access paths. The preferred conguration is at least three administratively coordinated
time servers providing service throughout the administrative domain including campus
networks and subnetworks. Each of these should obtain service from at least two dif-
ferent outside sources of synchronization, preferably via dierent gateways and access
paths. These sources should all operate at the same stratum level, which is one less
than the stratum level to be used by the local time servers themselves. In addition,
each of these time servers should peer with all of the other time servers in the local
administrative domain at the stratum level used by the local time servers, as well as at
least one (dierent) outside source at this level. This conguration results in the use
of six outside sources at a lower stratum level (toward the primary source of synchro-
nization, usually a radio clock), plus three outside sources at the same stratum level,
for a total of nine outside sources of synchronization.
When planning your network you might, beyond this, keep in mind a few generic
don’ts, in particular:
1. Don’t synchronize a local time server to another peer at the same stratum, unless
the latter is receiving time from lower stratum sources the former doesn’t talk
to directly. This minimizes the occurrence of common points of failure, but does
not eliminate them in cases where the usual chain of associations to the primary
sources of synchronization are disrupted due to failures.
2. Don’t synchronize more than one time server in a particular administrative do-
main to the same time server outside that domain. Such a practice invites com-
mon points of failure, as well as raises the possibility of massive abuse, should the
conguration le be automatically distributed to a large number of clients.
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Waikato had followed these guidelines reasonably closely in conguring their three secondary
servers. Each server peered with the other two. Also, each server peered with between 3 and 5
servers overseas. There was some overlap between the three groups of overseas servers, although
between them the three Waikato secondary servers synchronised to 7 distinct overseas servers. All
of the overseas servers that ankh and ramses synchronised to were in the United States. johnwayne
synchronised to three primary servers in Australia as well as to two primary servers in the United
States. It could be argued that all three should be synchronised to at least one Australian primary
server and one American primary server so that all three secondary servers will remain in contact
with a primary server even if all direct links to the United States or Australia are cut.
The other NTP servers at Waikato can be sub-divided into three groups. One group consisted
of stratum 3 servers that synchronised to just one (one server), two (13 servers) or three (18
servers) of the Waikato secondary servers. A second group consisted of seven NTP servers in the
Physics department. All were clients of the Waikato secondary servers (three were clients of two
secondary servers, the other four were clients of all three secondary servers). In addition, each of
the seven Physics servers was a client of between two and ve of the other six Physics servers.
If the NTP conguration advice was followed, all seven Physics servers would synchronise to the
three Waikato secondary servers, with no links between the Physics servers.
A third group is the servers within the Computer Science department at Waikato. Four servers
were at stratum 3. Three were clients of two of the secondary servers, the fourth was a client of
all three. Also, each was a client of two or three of the other stratum 3 servers. All four were also
clients of lucy, a stratum four server, and lucy was a client of all four. lucy had a single stratum
5 client (mallowpuff), which synchronised only to lucy. xena, one of the stratum 3 servers, had
three stratum 4 clients (sql, cdwriter and smilla), with all three synchronising only to xena. sql
had one stratum 5 client, and smilla had four, with each of the stratum 5 clients synchronising
to a single server. This hierarchy is somewhat idiosyncratic. Nine servers synchronised to a
single server, making the subnet fragile. Also, the hierarchy had greater depth than justied by
the number of machines involved (six of the eight stratum 5 NTP servers discovered were in the
Waikato Computer Science department). Errors accumulate at each level of the NTP hierarchy.
Again, there were links between servers at the same stratum in cases where the two servers have
the same set of upstream links. There were also cases of a stratum 3 server synchronising to a
stratum 4 server.
Looking at NTP subnet organisation within each level 3 DNS domain, several patterns can
be observed. Where the NTP subnet within a domain was small, it was common for all of the
NTP servers within the domain to synchronise to between one and three of the Waikato secondary
servers. This was the case for 18 domains, in which a total of 7 servers synchronised to all three
secondary servers, 19 synchronised to two of the three, and 14 synchronised to one. The level 3
domain with the most hosts contained 10 machines, and in 12 cases the domain contained a single
machine.
Where a domain contained more than a few machines, the NTP subnet was usually organised
in a hierarchical fashion. One pattern observed was where there was a single stratum 3 NTP
server that synchronised to a sub-set of the Waikato secondary servers, with all other servers
in the domain at stratum 4 and synchronising only to the local stratum 3 server. This was the
case for cosc.canterbury.ac.nz (stratum 3 server synchronised to two secondary servers, with 91
clients), massey.ac.nz (synchronised to two secondary servers; had 3 clients) and citylink.co.nz
(synchronised to three secondary servers; had 3 clients). These subnets are vulnerable to a failure
of the single stratum 3 server.
A more robust version of this pattern is where a domain has a two or more stratum 3 servers
(that synchronise to some sub-set of the Waikato stratum 3 servers), and a greater number of
stratum 4 servers that synchronise to a sub-set of the local stratum 3 servers. This was the case
for:
 topnz.ac.nz|two stratum 3 servers; two stratum 4 servers synchronised to both stratum
3 servers.
10
 acneilsen.co.nz|two stratum 3 servers; four stratum 4 servers synchronised to both stra-
tum 3 servers.
 otago.ac.nz|three stratum 3 servers; 13 stratum 4 servers synchronised to all three stra-
tum 3 servers In addition, three stratum 2 servers were encountered that synchronised to
Otago’s stratum 1 server as well as to the three local stratum 3 servers.
 auckland.ac.nz|six main stratum 3 servers (two had 9 clients, three had 7, one had 4)
and two minor stratum 3 servers (one had 1 client, one had 0); 17 stratum 4 servers (12
synchronised to three stratum 3 servers, one synchronised to 2 servers, 4 synchronised to 1
server).
Auckland University had some NTP servers outside this main hierarchy. One was at stratum
2. It synchronised to a stratum 1 server in Australia, ankh and a local stratum 3 server
(having a server synchronise to a higher stratum server is strange). This stratum 2 server
was an orphan|it had no clients.
There was a small subnet within the Computer Science department. Two stratum three
servers (kakapo and cs20) synchronised to all three Waikato secondary servers and to each
other. A stratum 4 server (data) synchronised to kakapo, and a stratum 5 server (mail)
synchronised to data. Again, a hierarchy this deep is not needed.
Of the 15 stratum 3 servers listed above, 2 synchronised to one secondary server, 5 to two
secondary servers and 8 to three secondary servers.
There was an interesting variation on this theme for plain.co.nz, which had three stratum
three servers. Each server synchronised to two Waikato secondary servers, with each synchronising
to a dierent pair. Each server also synchronised to the other two.
The CRI and comnet NTP servers were arranged in something close to a hierarchy. The main
servers were tui.grace.cri.nz and selket.grace.irl.cri.nz. tui is a stratum 2 server that
synchronised to tictoc.tip.CSIRO.AU (stratum 1), ankh and a stratum 3 comnet server (another
case of a higher stratum peer). selket was a stratum 3 server that synchronised only to tui. The
remaining servers synchronised to various groups of peers. Seven synchronised to both tui and
selket. All chose tui as their system peer (and were therefore at stratum 3)|synchronising to
selket is redundant as the only server selket synchronises to is tui. Five servers synchronised
to ramses and selket. All chose ramses as their system peer and so are at stratum 2. Three
servers synchronised only to selket, so were at stratum 4. One of these three (brahms) had a
stratum 5 client (invermay). One server synchronised to tui and a stratum 3 comnet server, and
one server synchronised to tui, selket and ramses.
Having one main server synchronise exclusively to another of the main servers does not make
for a robust design. This particular group of hosts would be better restructured as a two level
hierarchy, with the top level consisting of two or three hosts at stratum 3 (or 2) and the bottom
level hosts at stratum 4 (or 3). Another benet of this approach is to eliminate the stratum 5
server (again, the number of servers involved does not justify a server operating at stratum 5).
Another pattern is for most or all hosts in a domain to be at stratum 3, and for there to be
many links between them (even though these links often do not give access to any new upstream
NTP servers). Examples of this pattern include:
 NTP servers on 24 hosts were encountered in the clix.net.nz and clear.net.nz domains.
One of these was simply a client of ankh, and will not be discussed further. The remaining
servers can be divided into two groups. Four of the 23 had \LosAngeles" as part of their host
name (a fth failed to respond to xntpdc queries). Three of the four LosAngeles machines
were synchronised to 7 stratum 2 and 3 servers in the USA, as well as ankh and 8 clear
and clix servers. The fourth LosAngeles server, b1-fa0-0-0.losangeles.clix.net.nz
was synchronised to just one NTP server|ankh.
The second group (of 19 servers) synchronised to at least 6 peers (ve synchronised to 11
peers, seven synchronised to 10 peers). All 19 synchronised to ankh and two LosAngeles
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servers (b1-fa0-0-0 and b2-fa-0-0-0). The other three to eight peers synchronised to are
drawn from the group of 19. Each of the 19 had between 0 and 18 of the other members of
the group as clients.
This was one of the few large New Zealand subnets that had some synchronisation paths that
did not pass through the Waikato secondary servers. Three hosts in the subnet each syn-
chronised to seven NTP servers in the USA. Also, all hosts except b1-fa0-0-0.losangeles
synchronised to b2-fa-0-0-0, one of the three servers that synchronised to the seven USA
servers.
Even so, there are some unusual aspects to the subnet. The large number of links between
stratum 3 servers runs counter to the NTP conguration advice. Also, the fact that 21
servers synchronised to b1-fa0-0-0 is strange, as it relies entirely on ankh for its timing
information. This is odd for two reasons. First, ankh is a stratum 2 server that was getting
its timing information via long-distance links to the United States. The timing errors that
occur on such links are then compounded by b1-fa0-0-0 using such a link to get timing
information o ankh, and compounded again for each New Zealand server that synchronises
to b1-fa0-0-0. Second, there were two clix machines in Los Angeles that had 7 US peers
that could have been chosen instead of b1-fa0-0-0.
 Eight NTP servers in the manawatu.gen.nz and manawatu.net.nz domains communicate
extensively with each other. All synchronised to the three Waikato secondary servers, and
to eight or nine of the others (except one that synchronised to only one of the others). All
had 6 or 7 of the others as clients. In this case all eight servers fall back on their local clocks
as a synchronisation source if connections to Waikato fail, which might explain why there is
so much synchronisation between stratum 3 servers.
 The ix.net.nz subnet followed this pattern to some extent, and the hierarchical pattern to
some extent. Five servers at stratum 3 all synchronised to ramses, ankh and four overseas
NTP servers (three in the United States, one in Australia). Each of the ve stratum 3 servers
synchronised to three of the others. There are two stratum 4 servers that synchronised to
the stratum 3 servers (one synchronised to three stratum 3 servers, the other to four).
4.4 Summary
At a micro level, several opportunities for improving the subnet structure have been identied.
Many are related to ensuring that each client synchronises to more than one peer, and avoiding
synchronising to excessive numbers of peers at the same stratum.
At a macro level, the main structural shortcomings of the New Zealand NTP subnet are the
lack of any public primary servers, and the concentration of all public secondary servers at a single
site.
The fact that the three Waikato secondary servers had many more clients than other servers
within New Zealand (ankh has 161 clients) is not of itself a problem. Mills et al. encountered
many servers with more than 200 clients, including a stratum 1 server with 652 clients [3]. This
indicates that ankh was not dangerously overloaded, even though it had the most clients of any
New Zealand NTP server.
5 Accuracy measures for the New Zealand NTP subnet
In addition to collecting structural information, ntpcrawl also collected various pieces of data for
each NTP server that indicate how well clocks are being synchronised. By analysing this data we
can determine whether the structural shortcomings of the New Zealand NTP subnet (such as lack
of a stratum 1 server and reliance on three secondary servers located on the same site) have an
obvious adverse eect on the accuracy of clock synchronisation achieved by NTP.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function of the estimated time oset with respect to the system
peer for the four data sets collected on 1998-11-24.
Results of a recent large-scale study of NTP performance around the globe are described by
Mills et al.[3]. In their study, data was gathered from 13,880 NTP servers. The main performance
indicators presented is time oset, which is NTP’s estimate of the current oset between the local
clock and that of the system peer. Three other performance indicators are presented as well,
including round trip delay with respect to the system peer, and the estimated frequency oset
between the local clock and UTC.
Mills et al. present their results as cumulative density functions. Figure 1 shows time osets
we measured presented as CDFs. For a particular time oset t, the corresponding Y value is the
proportion of the time osets recorded whose value is greater than t. Where t is very small, nearly
all time osets recorded are greater than t, so the Y value plotted is close to 1. As t grows, so the
proportion of the values recorded that are greater than t shrinks.
For each of our seven day’s worth of data, we produced four cumulative density function plots
to compare with the four presented in [3]. In all 28 cases (four plots for each of seven delays), our
curve was below that of Mills et al. This means that the time osets (and other indicators) for
something over 300 New Zealand NTP servers were (overall) lower than those reported by Mills
et al. for nearly 14,000 NTP servers. Lower time osets, indicate better synchronisation.
In this paper, we have included three cumulative density function plots as examples. All show
results from the 4 datasets recorded on 1998-11-24. In all three gures results are shown for hosts
that meet the criteria given above for the \respondNZ" dataset.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative density functions for the estimated oset between the NTP
server’s local clock and that of its system peer. The 50th percentiles for the four datasets range
from 2.6 milliseconds to 3.1ms and the 95th percentiles from 46.8ms to 110.35ms. For probabilities
less then 0.1 the points for the 0305 dataset are below the points for the other three datasets. This
occurs because network loadings tend to be lower in the early hours of the morning, resulting in
lower message delays and better clock synchronisation. This eect was observed in most of our
cumulative density function plots.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative density functions for the round trip message delay between the
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of the round trip delay measured with respect to the
system peer for the four data sets collected on 1998-11-24.
NTP server and its system peer. The 50th percentiles for the four datasets are 4.0ms in all cases
and the 95th percentiles range from 109.5ms to 204.5ms.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative density functions for root dispersion. Dispersion is an estimate
of the expected maximum error between an NTP server’s clock and some other clock. Root
dispersion is an estimate of the expected maximum error between the NTP server’s clock and the
stratum 0 clock it is ultimately synchronised to. In other words, the expected maximum error
with respect to UTC. The 50th percentiles for the four datasets range from 63.2ms to 78.5ms and
the 95th percentiles from 167.4ms to 683.6ms. Maximum dispersions in the early morning are
clearly lower than at other times of the day.
Another observation based on the data collected relates to NTP’s estimate of systemic fre-
quency oset. A clock’s systematic frequency oset is the dierence between the rate of the local
clock and that of UTC. Frequency oset is often expressed in units of microseconds per second.
The frequency oset of the clock in a typical workstation usually lies between -100 and 100 mi-
croseconds per second. For all seven days the frequency oset cumulative density functions of all
four datasets were very close to each other. This indicates that frequency oset measures are less
susceptible to long message delays than clock oset estimates.
Overall, there was nothing in the data collected to indicate major persistent problems with the
accuracy of NTP within New Zealand. The performance indicators reported in [3] are primarily
aimed at assessing how well each NTP server synchronises to its direct peers (time oset with
respect to the system peer is the main performance indicator used). No results are given that
indicate how closely NTP servers are synchronised to UTC. Given that New Zealand has no public
primary servers, it would have been interesting to compare our root dispersion measurements with
those of Mills et al., but system dispersion is not reported in [3].
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of the system dispersion for the four data sets collected
on 1998-11-24.
6 Reasons for the clock steps
Because no obvious major problems were found with the overall accuracy of NTP within New
Zealand, an investigation of NTP logs was carried out to determine the unusual conditions that
caused the clock steps recorded on kaka. Mills comments that \Corrections of this magnitude
[over 128ms] are exceedingly rare, usually as the result of reboot, broken hardware or missed
leap-second events." [5].
Our stratum 3 server, kaka, synchronises to two of the Waikato secondary servers (ankh and
ramses) and so is congured in a manner common to many other New Zealand NTP servers. In
a 31 day period covering late July and most of August, 1998, a total of 36 clock steps occurred
on kaka. The availability of NTP logs covering that period allowed investigation into the causes
of the steps. In some cases the information in the logs was inconclusive, but in others the causes
of the steps were reasonably clear.
In 18 cases (nine pairs of steps) the steps resulted from large errors in oset estimates caused
by long round trip delays. In each case a message exchange with one server with a round trip delay
of between 300ms and 900ms (the minimum round trip delay is around 34ms) was immediately
followed by a similar message exchange with the other server. If both message exchanges produce
highly inaccurate clock oset estimates (which is possible if the round trip delay is high, but is
not necessarily the case) then the NTP server falsely concludes that its own clock is in error by
more than 128ms and steps the clock.
In nine cases we observed clock steps caused by the long round trip delays in the most recent
message exchange with each server. In all nine cases, the round trip delays of the following few
message exchanges were much lower. The server quickly realised that it had made a mistake in
stepping the clock in the rst place, and after about ve minutes steps the local clock in the
opposite direction by about the same amount.
One thing about this behaviour puzzled us. For each peer, NTP buers details of the 8 most
recent message exchanges so that it if an occasional message exchange with a long round trip
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delay occurs NTP can choose to use one of the other 7 recent message exchanges in calculating
the current time oset. In the cases we observed, there were always message exchanges within the
last 8 that had low message delays. Clearly, the NTP server was ignoring these for some reason,
otherwise the step would not have occurred.
To nd out why NTP seemed to be overlooking recent message exchanges, the source code
(version 3) was consulted. When looking through its buer of 8 recent message exchanges, NTP
ignores those that occurred over 800 seconds ago. When the 9 steps occurred, NTP was polling
each server at intervals of 1024 seconds, which meant that all but the most recent message exchange
were ignored. NTP version 4 has a dierent way of determining how many of the buered message
exchanges to consider, which may turn out to be better in practise than the version 3 method.
Other steps seem to have been caused by the clocks of ankh and ramses diering by a large
amount (over 200ms), and kaka deciding to change its system peer from one to the other. This
happened on a number of occasions on August 6th. During the period described, round trip delays
were low (all were under 100ms) so the estimates of time oset with respect to each server were
accurate to within 30ms or less. Initially kaka was synchronised to ramses. kaka then came up
with time osets of -29ms for ramses and 219ms for ankh, and decided to switch to ankh as its
system peer (resulting in a 219ms clock step). Five minutes later, kaka came up with time osets
of 38ms for ankh and -256ms for ramses, and decided to switch to ramses as its system peer (the
clock was stepped by -256ms). Five minutes later again, kaka came up with time osets of 6ms
for ramses and 273ms for ankh, and decided to switch to ankh as its system peer (the clock was
stepped by 273ms).
The behaviour just described indicates that the clocks of two of the Waikato secondary servers
diered by around a quarter of a second|a very large dierence indeed. Just before this sequence
of \clock hops" occurred, there was evidence in the logs that ramses clock changed rapidly (quite
possibly it was stepped). In three successive message exchanges (at intervals of 1024 seconds),
all with round trip delays of less than 60ms, the following osets with respect to ramses were
estimated: 12ms, -87ms, -232ms.
Later, xntpd log records from ankh and ramses covering a three day period in February 1999
were compared with log records from kaka. Several steps occurred on all three machines. In ve
cases, a step on ankh or ramses was followed within ve to ten minutes by a step on kaka of about
the same size. This conrms that some steps made on kaka are caused by steps in the clocks of
the Waikato secondary servers (our July/August data indicated that such steps were occurring,
but we were unable to access the Waikato logs to conrm this). One particularly large pair of
steps was observed for ramses. Its clock was stepped by 588ms, then ve minutes later stepped
by -659ms.
7 Conclusions
We have described experiments performed to investigate the structure of the NTP subnet in New
Zealand, and to record various performance indicators for the NTP servers encountered. We have
also investigated the reasons behind some large time steps that occurred on our department’s main
NTP server.
Investigations into the structure of the New Zealand NTP subnet found that NTP was in use
by many organisations. The structure of the NTP subnet is largely determined by the independent
decisions of a large group of system administrators, without a great deal of coordination occur-
ring. This is reflected in the many connection patterns we encountered. The major structural
shortcomings of the New Zealand NTP subnet is that it lacks public primary servers, and that
there are no public secondary servers outside the three at Waikato. We came across a number of
cases in which it appeared that organisations could improve their NTP congurations (in terms
of the their internal NTP server hierarchy and external peers). Scope exists for writing a tool to
analyse an organisation’s NTP subnet and reporting on potential conguration problems.
Comparing various performance indicators taken from the New Zealand NTP subnet with those
reported in an Internet-wide NTP study does not indicate the presence of any major systemic
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performance problems within the New Zealand NTP subnet. Investigation of clock steps that
occurred on kaka shows that the structural problems identied above were a factor in at least
some of them. Some clock steps were caused by long round trip delays for packet exchanges
with all stratum 2 servers. Having all of New Zealand’s public secondary servers at a single site
increases the chances that long delays will be experienced with respect to all secondary servers
synchronised to. This was not helped by the fact that the NTP version 3 ltering algorithm only
considers results from the most recent message exchange when the poll interval is 1024 seconds
(such a poll interval is common).
On other occasions a step of the clock of a Waikato secondary server lead to a step of kaka’s
clock. Clock steps on Waikato secondary servers most likely are a result of the fact that they have
to rely on long and frequently congested international links to get access to timing information
from primary servers. Having primary servers within New Zealand would help to avoid this.
In summary, the lack of stratum 1 servers in New Zealand and the concentration of all stratum
2 servers at a single site can be identied as potential problems from a knowledge guidelines on
NTP conguration. By investigating reasons for steps in the clock of a local stratum 3 servers,
we have conrmed that the New Zealand NTP subnet conguration does indeed lead to relatively
poor synchronisation from time to time. Improvements to New Zealand’s NTP subnet will be of
benet to anyone interested in sub-second clock synchronisation.
A conguration that should lead to much more accurate clock synchronisation within New
Zealand would involve establishing two or three public primary NTP servers at dierent sites in
New Zealand, supported by six or so public secondary servers distributed throughout the country.
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